Simplifying Parties vs. Protecting Representation
Ahmad Tholabi Kharlie
(Professor at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta)
The proposal to raise the parliamentary threshold from 4 percent to 7 percent in the revision of the Election Law has sparked debate in the public sphere.
Some view the proposal as a rational step to simplify the party system, which has long been considered overly fragmented.
However, many argue that the policy could actually narrow the space for political representation and even erode the fundamental meaning of democracy as a system that accommodates diverse aspirations.
The debate has intensified as data shows the large number of votes that fail to convert into parliamentary seats due to the threshold.
In the 2024 election, it is estimated that more than 17 million votes did not result in parliamentary representation because the chosen parties failed to meet the threshold.
This figure reflects the dynamics of our democracy, showing that behind orderly electoral procedures, there are still citizens’ voices that have not found representation in parliament.
Public discussion has since moved to a more fundamental level. It has shifted from the issue of threshold numbers to a normative question about the direction of Indonesian democracy: should it prioritize government effectiveness through party simplification or remain a broad arena for representing the nation’s socio-political diversity?
Amid these competing interests, the discussion of the Election Bill becomes an important moment to reconsider the balance between political stability and fair representation.
Two Poles of Democracy
In modern democratic theory, representation is a fundamental element that supports political legitimacy in a democratic system.
Robert A. Dahl (1971) emphasized that democracy rests on two main principles: inclusiveness and competition.
A parliamentary threshold is essentially a limitation on inclusiveness in order to maintain system stability.
At this point, democracy enters a paradox. The higher the threshold, the fewer parties enter parliament, and the easier decision-making becomes. But at the same time, the greater the potential loss of voters’ voices.
Comparative global data shows significant variation in threshold practices.
Germany sets a 5 percent threshold as a historical lesson from extreme fragmentation during the Weimar Republic.
Turkey once applied a 10 percent threshold—one of the highest in the world—which resulted in a very high level of wasted votes, reaching nearly 45 percent in the 2002 election.
In contrast, the Netherlands does not apply a formal threshold and instead uses a natural threshold of around 0.67 percent, allowing almost all votes to be converted into seats.
These experiences show that the higher the threshold, the greater the disproportionality in the electoral system.
Arend Lijphart (1999) noted that countries with lower thresholds tend to have more inclusive social representation and better long-term democratic stability.
Giovanni Sartori (1976) warned that simplifying party systems may improve government effectiveness, but if done excessively, it can reduce the quality of representation.
In this context, a threshold that is too high can shift from being a tool of stability into an instrument of political exclusion.
In Indonesia’s political practice, the argument of stability is often used to justify simplifying the party system.
Party fragmentation is seen as an obstacle to effective governance and legislative efficiency. However, stability built through limiting representation always carries a legitimacy dilemma.
When millions of votes are not converted into seats, the representative system loses its representative power.
Pippa Norris (2004) describes this as a “representational deficit”—a condition where electoral design creates a gap between voter preferences and the composition of the legislature.
In the long term, such a deficit can reduce public trust and weaken political participation.
A Middle Path for Democracy
From a constitutional law perspective, the parliamentary threshold is directly linked to the principles of popular sovereignty and equality of votes.
Jimly Asshiddiqie (2005) emphasized that electoral policy must balance government effectiveness and fairness in representation.
A threshold is legitimate as a legal instrument, but it must not create excessive distortion between the people’s votes and parliamentary composition.
Saldi Isra (2017) also warned that a threshold set too high can produce disproportionality in a proportional electoral system.
When votes do not translate into seats, an imbalance arises between voter will and political representation.
International experience shows that plural democracies generally adopt moderate thresholds between 3 and 5 percent.
Germany, Poland, and New Zealand use a 5 percent threshold; Sweden applies 4 percent, while highly plural societies tend to avoid high thresholds due to the risk of disrupting political integration.
Turkey serves as an extreme example of how a high threshold can distort democracy.
For decades, its 10 percent threshold left millions of votes unrepresented and drew strong criticism from international institutions such as the Council of Europe.
The European Court of Human Rights even described the policy as an excessive restriction on representation.
In Indonesia’s plural context, these comparative lessons suggest that a drastic increase in the threshold risks deepening the representational deficit.
A more rational middle path would be to improve parliamentary institutional design through other mechanisms, such as tightening the requirements for forming factions and improving the governance of political coalitions to make them more stable and accountable.
This approach allows for more effective legislative performance while still preserving the principle of vote equality as the foundation of democracy.
In conclusion, the debate over the parliamentary threshold goes beyond numbers—it touches the core direction of Indonesian democracy: how to design a political system that ensures effective governance while guaranteeing fair representation for all citizens.
This article was published in KOMPAS on Tuesday, March 3, 2026.