Public Policy Meets Fiqh: Rethinking ZISWAF’s Role in Indonesia’s MBG Program
Mohammad Nur Rianto Al Arif
Professor at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta / Secretary General of the Indonesian Lecturers Association (DPP ADI) / Executive Board Member of IAEI / Executive Board Member of ISEI Jakarta Chapter / Associate at CSED INDEF
The Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) Program has become one of today’s priority agendas. This program is not merely about food on students’ plates but about the quality of human resources, the future of the next generation, and the direction of national development. On various occasions, the government has emphasized that MBG is a long-term investment, not merely social spending.
Interestingly, during a socialization forum for the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ (Kemenag) 2025–2029 priority programs in Jakarta, a statement emerged that the national potential of zakat and waqf should be optimized to support MBG. This idea opens broad discussion: is it possible for Islamic social finance instruments such as zakat, infaq, sadaqah, and waqf (ZISWAF) to be involved in supporting the free nutritious meals program?
This question is not simple, as it touches on public policy, fiscal governance, and fiqh, which has clear normative boundaries, particularly regarding the eight categories of zakat beneficiaries (asnaf). This is where the discussion becomes both interesting and sensitive. This article examines analytically and critically whether ZISWAF can and should be involved in supporting MBG.
Conceptually, MBG is designed as a response to chronic malnutrition, stunting, and unequal access to nutritious food. Data from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) and various health surveys show that malnutrition and stunting remain serious challenges, although the trend has improved in recent years.
MBG aims to ensure that schoolchildren, especially those from vulnerable families, receive adequate nutrition. The logic is straightforward: healthy and well-nourished children will have better learning capacity, higher long-term productivity, and greater social mobility.
However, behind this simple concept lies a major question: how will it be financed? With tens of millions of potential beneficiaries, MBG requires a very large and sustainable budget. This is where the idea of optimizing Islamic social finance emerges.
At the 2025–2029 priority program forum, the Ministry of Religious Affairs encouraged optimizing national zakat and waqf potential to support MBG. Indonesia indeed has enormous zakat potential. Various studies estimate national zakat potential at more than 300 trillion rupiah annually, although actual collection remains far below that figure.
As the authoritative national zakat management institution, the National Amil Zakat Agency (BAZNAS) has recorded increased zakat collection in recent years. This trend indicates growing public awareness of zakat obligations and its social role.
From a macro perspective, it is reasonable to ask: if zakat potential is so large and MBG serves a social purpose, why not integrate them? However, this is where we must pause and enter the realm of fiqh.
Zakat is not merely an alternative fiscal instrument. It is a financial act of worship (ibadah maaliyah) with strict rules. The Qur’an explicitly mentions eight categories (asnaf) of zakat recipients in Surah At-Taubah verse 60: the poor (fakir), the needy (miskin), zakat administrators (amil), new converts (muallaf), those in bondage (riqab), debtors (gharim), those striving in the path of Allah (fi sabilillah), and stranded travelers (ibnu sabil).
The question is whether MBG falls into one of these eight categories. Literally and structurally, MBG as a universal free meal program for all students does not automatically fit within the eight ASNAF. Not all MBG recipients are poor or needy. If the program is universal, there is a risk that zakat would be distributed to those who do not qualify as legitimate beneficiaries (mustahik) under fiqh.
This is where the fiqh issue arises. If zakat funds are used directly to finance MBG in its entirety, there is a risk of violating sharia principles of zakat distribution. Zakat cannot be diverted to general purposes without clear linkage to the asnaf.
There is debate regarding the interpretation of “fi sabilillah.” Some scholars broaden its meaning to include all forms of public benefit. However, the majority of classical scholars limit it to specific struggles in the path of Allah, not general state social programs. From a cautious fiqh perspective, zakat cannot directly become the main source of financing for a universal MBG program.
Beyond fiqh, governance must also be considered. If zakat is used to fund government programs that should be financed by the state budget (APBN), there is a risk of moral hazard. The state has a constitutional obligation to ensure public welfare. If that responsibility is shifted to zakat funds, it could amount to a “privatization of state responsibility” through religious instruments.
Zakat is not a substitute for taxes. It has its own maqashid (objectives): wealth redistribution and empowerment of mustahik so they can escape poverty. An inappropriate integration of zakat with MBG could create both fiqh and governance problems.
Does this mean ZISWAF cannot be involved at all? The answer is no. Islamic social finance instruments can still participate through a more creative and sharia-compliant approach. ZISWAF funds can support the productive ecosystem that sustains the program.
For example, financing could be allocated productively to poor farmers supplying MBG food ingredients, or capital support could be provided to small-scale livestock breeders and fishermen who qualify as mustahik. Productive waqf could also fund the development of food centers or community-based kitchens, as well as empower food-related micro and small enterprises managed by poor families.
Under this scheme, zakat is still distributed to eligible asnaf—such as the poor—in the form of productive assistance. The resulting output becomes part of the MBG supply chain. In this way, zakat does not finance general consumption but empowers mustahik to become part of the national food production system. This approach aligns more closely with maqashid al-shariah, particularly the protection of wealth (hifzh al-mal) and the protection of life (hifzh al-nafs).
Unlike zakat, waqf has broader flexibility. Productive waqf can finance supporting infrastructure for MBG, such as agricultural land, cold storage facilities, public kitchens, or distribution centers.
Food waqf models have been implemented in several Muslim-majority countries through collective waqf-based agriculture. If professionally managed, waqf can become a sustainable long-term funding source. In Indonesia, strengthening the role of the Indonesian Waqf Board (BWI) could be key to integrating productive waqf with food security and MBG agendas.
Thus, the key to whether ZISWAF can be involved lies in policy design. If ZISWAF is positioned as a supporter of productive ecosystems and mustahik empowerment, it is both fiqh-compliant and economically strategic.
However, if ZISWAF is positioned as a fiscal deficit cover or as a source for universal consumption financing, the risk of sharia deviation and governance problems will arise. Synergy must be principle-based, not merely budget-driven pragmatism.
MBG is a major step in Indonesia’s human development. Its financing, however, must be designed with prudence and integrity.
Islamic social finance holds extraordinary potential to support development. But it is not a reserve fund for any purpose. It has firm fiqh boundaries and noble social objectives.
The challenge is not whether ZISWAF may be involved but how to design its involvement so that it remains consistent with the eight asnaf, does not replace the state’s fiscal responsibility, promotes productive economic empowerment, and builds a sustainable food ecosystem.
If carefully designed, ZISWAF can become a catalyst that strengthens the socio-economic foundation of MBG. If handled without caution, it risks serious theological and governance problems.
This is where public policy and fiqh must engage in dialogue, not negate one another. Ultimately, the goal is not only to provide meals today but also to build a system that enables society to feed itself in the future.
This article was published in CNBC Indonesia on Wednesday, February 25, 2026.